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Abstract 
Ethnic identity and conflict often inter-married in countries where 
diversities on such grounds were seen as a threat. Conflicts in the post cold 
war period attained a new dimension. The Balkan region has been one of the 
most conflict prone regions in the world where conflict arising from ethnic 
difference was not uncommon. Kosovo, former province of Serbia is a case 
in point. The roots of Serbian and Albanian communities’ conflict regarding 
Kosovo dated back since the medieval period after the conquest of Kosovo 
by Serbs. The primary cause may not be ethnicity, rather it is political but 
once conflict happen ethnic identity and history will play pivotal role to 
manipulate and galvanize support for each parties cause. This article try to 
assess the interplay between ethnic identity and conflict resulting the rise of 
dangerous ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia and contributing repressive 
violent action against its majority Albanian province, Kosovo and its 
eventual declaration of unilateral independence.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 The end of the Cold War has profound impacts in the nature and 
processes of conflicts. The one’s dominant inter-state conflicts in that period 
give way to the recurrent intra-state ethnic conflicts as a dominant trend in 
the post cold war period. One of the key flash points of inter-ethnic conflict 
is the Balkan region, the ethnic mosaic of Europe. Although ethnic conflict is 
not a new phenomenon in the Balkan, it was muted or frozen in the cold war 
partly because of ideology and perhaps charismatic leadership (of Tito). The 
death of Tito and the subsequent disintegration of socialism make those old 
frozen problems to quickly resurface particularly in Yugoslavia.  
 The institutional capacity of the former Yugoslavia was very weak. 
So it resorted to force to settle dissidents and have strong central control. In 
light of such challenges the multi ethnic Yugoslavia faced increasing ethnic 
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cleavage and polarization along ethnic lines that exacerbated its demise.  
 The main theme of this paper is to show how ethnic identities shapes 
and influences the Kosovo Crisis. Kosovo is considered by Serbs as their 
spiritual and cultural centre, even they call it as their own ‘Jerusalem.’ 
Albanians too considered it as the cradle of their national culture. When we 
see the history of the region, the earliest known inhabitants of Kosovo were 
called Illyrians by both Greeks and Romans.12 Albanians are descended from 
the Illyrian tribe, which settled the area around 1200 BC. By the end of the 
12th century they were conquered by the Serbian leader Stephen Nemanja.13 
Life under the Serbs was so harsh that the Albanians were subject to heavy 
taxes and many left Kosovo. At the famous battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 
the Serbs and their allies were defeated by the Ottoman Turks and later 
became part of the Ottoman Empire. Most Albanians then converted to 
Islam, and were resettled again in Kosovo getting their lost land. Later Serbia 
became under complete control of the Ottomans and subjected to servitude. 
In 1878 the Congress of Berlin declared Serbia a state after a war between 
Russia and Turkey followed by the expulsion of thousands of Albanians to 
Kosovo.14 
 After the first Balkan war (1912) Serbia placed Kosovo under its 
military rule. In 1913, following the second Balkan war, the Great powers 
forced Albania to give Kosovo to Serbia in the London conference.15 
Consequently any Albanian rebellion was dealt by force including expulsion, 
massacre and looting by Serbs. Colonization Commission was setup to 
restore a Serb balance in the area. Many historians and politicians of Serbia 
suggested forced expulsion of Kosovo Albanians. One of such Chauvinistic 
historian was Vaso Cubrilovic, in 1937 presented a memorandum of the 
Serbian cultural club called the Expulsion of the Albanians. He wrote that:  
The Albanians should be completely expelled from the Kingdom through 
the use of propaganda; taking away their rights, land and jobs; and 
destroying their culture. If none of this worked, armed terror tactics, 
riots, and the burning of villages would force the rest out. He warned 
that if the Albanian problem was not dealt with speedily, Serbia would 
pay a weighty price in the future.16  
 After Tito came to power there were relative freedoms to Kosovar- 
                                                          
12 Jansen, G. Richard. ‘Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History’, Colorado  
   State University, April 1999, (updated June 5, 1999 and November 12, 2002) 
13 Rezun, Miron. Europe's Nightmare: The Struggle for Kosovo. Praeger, Westport, CT, 
2001,  
   27. 
14  Ibid, 25 
15  Kosovo was made part of Yugoslavia as confirmed in the Versailles Conference of 1919. 
16  Rezun, 2001, 29 
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Albanians especially after the removal of Aleksander Rankovic, the head of 
state Secret police, in 1966 that used repressive policies of Serbianization 
against the ethnic Albanians. The Kosovars continued to press the 
government to gain a republican status and even for independence. As a 
result the 1974 constitution made Kosovo a republic in all but name, giving it 
the closest to republic status under the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. 
Therefore, Kosovo had its own constitution, government, courts and national 
bank and an equal voice with in the collective Federal Presidency.17 The 
abolishing of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 by Milosevic precipitated a crisis 
which hastened Yugoslav’s collapse and ultimately invited NATO’s air 
strike in 1999. 
 
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS  
 Understanding concepts related to ethnicity and nationalism will help 
us to know the nature of ethnic conflicts well. These elements are the most 
important identifying factors for human beings especially in time of crisis.  
 Ethnicity: It is the state of being ethnic or belonging to a certain 
ethnic group according to Kellas.18 An ethnic group is defined as “a group of 
people who are generally recognized by themselves and/or the other as a 
distinct group, with such recognition based on social or cultural 
characteristics.19 Ethnicity as such may refer an ethnic affiliation derived 
from a shared cultural ties and historical experiences.  
 Nationalism: Ethnicity is highly linked to nationalism since the latter 
is based on real or assumed ethnic ties.20 However, nationalism has broader 
meaning and may involve different groups in a state beyond particular 
identity. In this sense nationalism has politico-ideological dimensions.  
 Ethnic nationalism: It happens when ethnic identity is manipulated 
to promote nationalism. Here the source of identification is not political 
institutions rather it is culture. Thus, it will threaten the existence of the state 
especially in multi ethnic state where minority rights will be tramped by the 
dominant ethnic group. Particularly in a state where its institutional 
structures are weak, nationalism is likely to be based on ethnic distinctions. 
 In this regard Brown argued that the rise of ethnic nationalism in one 
                                                          
17  Bellamy, Alex J., “Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99’’ in Ken Booth’s (ed.) The 
Kosovo  
   Tragedy, the Human Right Dimension, 2001, 106. 
18  Kellas Cited in Angeliki Sotiropoulou, ‘The role of ethnicity in ethnic conflict, the case 
of   
Yugoslavia’(Undated)http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/26506/ipublicationd
ocment_singledocument/bba173d5-10ab-4577-8d49-60d8256e778d/en/PN04.02.pdf 
19  Cornell, 1998 cited in Angeliki Sotiropoulou’s article. 
20  Ibid. 
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group will be seen as threatening by others and will lead to the development 
of similar sentiments elsewhere. This will sharpened distinctions between 
groups, make it more likely that minority groups will be persecuted and more 
likely that minority groups will demand states of their own.21 
 Most of the time ethnic nationalism manifested at the level of 
collectivity. This particular collective cultural identity is named by Smith as 
the ethnie, or ethnic community. Ethnie is a named human population with a 
myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements; a link 
with a historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity.22 Therefore, 
we can deduce that ethnic identity is a sense of belonging to the ethnie.  
 In light of the above key concepts, this paper will try to figure out 
how ethnicity, culture and historical factors are primarily manipulated for 
political purposes that contributed to the rise of dangerous ethno nationalism 
in Yugoslavia that result in repressive violent action against its majority 
Albanian province, Kosovo. In such conflicts ethnic identity plays pivotal 
role which can easily draw the attention of the people in the belief of 
common ancestry. This in turn arouses the passion and nationalistic feelings 
of the group as an opportunity for political elites to retain and consolidate 
their power and follow other claims like territory and economic objectives. 
This is especially so in time of rapid deterioration of the legitimacy of 
government because of political changes that governments cannot easily cop 
it in case of authoritarian regimes.  
 Thus, such leaders to distract the attentions of the people in retaining 
control of their power appeal to common ethnicity in terms of common 
cultural identity in order to bring social cohesion. Ethnic nationalism, as a 
result, develops a sense of ‘we’ and ‘others’ which hardened their respective 
stance towards one another.  
 
CAUSES OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS 
 The perception of conflict between Serbia and Albanian communities 
regarding Kosovo dated back since the medieval period after Kosovo was 
conquered by Serbs. Many factors can be seen as a cause for the conflict like 
ancient hatred, domination, manipulated nationalism, etc. The primary cause 
may not be ethnicity, rather it is political but once conflict happen ethnic 
identity and history will play pivotal role to manipulate and galvanize 
support for their cause. Of course the Albanians were subject to Serbian 
repression since they incorporated to Yugoslavia. They wanted their own 
independent republic or merger with Albania. But this demand is not 
                                                          
21 Brown, Michael, ‘Ethnicity & Violence’ in Guibernau and John Rex (eds.) The Ethnicity  
    Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, 1997, 85. 
22 Smith cited in Brown, Michael E., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 1993, 28-29. 
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acceptable by Serbs as they claimed it is as ‘Old Serbia’ which was their 
historic cultural and spiritual centre. The Kosovo crisis was exacerbated 
apart from historical problems, by the death of Tito, the subsequent student 
movement, the deterioration of the economy, Milosevic’s nationalism, and 
negligence of the international community.  
 As already mentioned earlier Kosovo had given all privileges 
Yugoslav republics enjoys except republican status by the 1974 constitution. 
This has been seen as a protection from Serbian hegemonic ambition. So 
Kosovo became a de facto republic. The constitution which left Serbia 
largely undefined, allow Kosovo… a say in Serbian affairs but ensured that 
Serbia had no say in the affairs of its former provinces.23 Obviously such 
provisions promoted grievance among Serbians that waits time to burst till 
Milosevic rose to power.  
 Tito wanted to create a Yugoslavia where there was no ethnic 
tension, where all were equal, where all were “Yugoslavs”. To this effect he 
wanted people to forget their national and ethnic history.24 Also he allowed 
Albanians to settle in Kosovo and did not return the expelled Serb colonists 
but resettle them in Vojvodina and created an autonomous republic of 
Kosovo.25 Largely, it can be said, his charismatic leadership contributed to 
the relative stability of Yugoslavia.  
 Following his death things started upside-down partly because there 
is no charismatic leader to take his position. In 1981, a year a after his death, 
student demonstration at Pristina university demanding better living 
conditions at campus began. It, however, quickly grow throughout the 
province. Soon after, workers and citizens joined demanding Kosovo to be a 
republic. The demonstrations were put down through harsh police 
measures.26 
 Indeed the Serbians aggrieved by the 1974 constitution have got a 
right opportunity following Tito’s death to target that constitution. And result 
in a significant resurgence of Serbian nationalism.27 For instance, in 1986, 
206 Belgrade writers, economists, historians, philosophers, and linguistics 
drafted the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences Memorandum as a 
critique of the Yugoslav system:  
They felt that Serbia had been weakened by the 1974 constitution (the 
one that had given Kosovo near republican status) and that Serbs 
                                                          
23 Griffiths, Stephen I. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security 
SIPRI Research Report, 5, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993,41. 
24 Rezun, 2001, 2 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 34. 
27 Griffiths, Stephen I. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security 
SIPRI Research Report, 5, Oxford University Press, New York 1993. 
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were victims of physical, political, legal and cultural genocide in 
Kosovo. They felt that the hundreds of thousands of Serbs who had 
left Kosovo had done so because of this genocide.28 
 Hence gradually the hands of nationalists strengthened and the tense 
situation in Kosovo led to the rise of Milosevic to power, who embraced 
nationalism by abandoning communism. Measures taken by Milosevic 
include the removal of political rights, Serbianization of Kosovo by 
supporting mass movements of Kosovo Serbs. His regime acted to excluded 
Albanians from education, banned the official use of Albanian language, 
severely restricted the use of Albanian symbols and attempted to redress the 
demographic imbalance between the Serbs and Albanians.29 
 To this effect the Serbian parliament, on 11 January 1995, passed the 
Decree for colonization of Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.30 
So for those Serbs wishing to move to Kosovo the state offered loans to erect 
houses and buy apartments and offered plots of land free of charge. But it is 
clear that the worsening economic and political situation in Kosovo make 
very few Serbs to go to there. As a result forced colonialism became the 
alternative. Several thousand Serb refugees from the Krajna region of 
Croatia began to arrive in Kosovo in August 1994.31 
 But the most catalytic factor for the conflict can be attributed to the 
abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, contrary to the quest for self 
determination claimed by Albanians. For the first time since 1946 Serbia 
assumed full administrative and executive power over Kosovo.32 In response 
Albanian members of the Kosovo government resigned in May 1990 to 
protest Serbia’s interference. On July they met and voted for self 
determination but immediately the Kosovo parliament is abolished and its 
leaders fled to Macedonia where they declared Kosovo’s independence.33 
 The cumulative effect of economic deprivation or economic 
apartheid, education apartheid, political and other measures contributed to 
the further detteriorizaiton and radicalizations of the relations between the 
two conflicting parties.  
 Why autonomy or republican status denied to the Kosovo Albanians? 
Long years of repression since they became part of Yugoslavia forced the 
Albanians to aspire independence. Their quest for republican status was turn 
down as it was considered to be a challenge to Serbian territorial integrity.  
                                                          
28 Rezun, 2001, 34 
29 Bellami in Booth (Ed,) 2001, 114. 
30 Ibid, 115 
31 Rezun, 2001, 42 
32 On 28 September, 1990, a new constitution definitely abolished the previous territorial 
autonomy of Kosovo, which fully incorporated into Serbia. 
33 Rezun, 2001, 37 
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 Caplan reasonably argued that Kosovo might very well have been a 
republic as it has distinct ethnic groups. Population with clear borders though 
might be contested. However, the architects of the Yugoslav federal system 
had reasoned in 1943 that the status of Republic should be reserved for 
nations (narodi) as opposed to nationalities (narudnosti) the former having 
their principal homeland inside Yugoslavia and the latter outside Yugoslavia. 
The Kosovo Albanians were thus a nationality because they presumably had 
their home land in Albania.34 So their demand for independence was rejected 
on the ground that self-determination was a right of republics and nations 
that built the Yugoslav federal state and not that of autonomous provinces 
and nationalities.  
 
Politicization of Ethnic Identity for Elite Manipulation  
 Here comes the role of identity/ethnicity which exploited for political 
purpose. After he lost wars with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina 
which he himself started, Milosevic’s legitimacy was dwindling and 
opposition at different corners flare up. The economic condition of the 
population worsened. Having looked at his position crumbling, he find 
another ‘scapegoat’ to remain in power. So he turned to Kosovo, since it is 
Serbia’s province and felt that the international community had no business 
there and hence raise the specter of nationalism.  
 History is the most emotive factor to unite the group in time of 
adversaries and it has a special place in the Balkan. Milosevic was smart in 
invoking the 600 years old tradition of Kosovo to arouse Serbian people to 
rally behind him in placing the Kosovo Albanians in virtual apartheid. As 
mentioned in Smith’s ethnie historical memories and myths constitute a 
crucial element of ethnicity. Such memories and myths supposed to unify 
groups with bonds of loyalty in order for social cohesion. History according 
to Booth is often painted in the darkest colures, but it is also a resource for 
rational hope.35 So the myth of the battle of Kosovo remained part of Serbs 
memory transmitted through generations. Serbian-nationalism pictured Serbs 
as victims of history; 
The sweep of Serb national history from the middle ages until the 
present day broadly encompasses a long, seemingly cyclical tale of 
freedom, betrayal, enslavement or exile, patient servitude and finally 
a struggle of liberation. In the end, their chroniclers and poets teach 
only unity among Serbs can prevail over the outsiders.36 
                                                          
34 Caplan, Richard,’International Diplomacy & the Crisis in Kosovo’. International  
    Affairs,Vol.74,No.4,1998. 
35 Booth (ed), 21 
36 Rezun,2001, 86 
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 Such narratives create a sense of ‘we’ and ‘outsiders’. Accordingly 
the Kosovar Albanians are identified as ‘outsiders’ occupying Serb’s 
‘homeland’. So, nationalist leaders targeted them as a way out to their 
political and economic folly. Albanians are always blamed for any 
misfortunes of Serbians, as a people not belonging to Serbia. Since 
Albanians are non-Slav and predominantly Muslims, they became an easy 
prey to Serb-nationalism given the historical hatred. As Serbs are Slavic 
people and dominantly Orthodox Christian they easily use this common 
culture against Albanians and dehumanizing them what ever their innocence. 
We understood from experience that cultural and religious nationalism is the 
most dangerous as shown between the Croats and Serbs, and Serbs over 
Bosnia.37 This is because religious and cultural identities are less mutable 
especially in time of conflicts where its savagery will not easily be forgotten.  
 Therefore the regime justified ethnic cleansing against Kosovo 
Albanians and make Kosovo’s territory Serbianized. This policy is largely 
associated with the political idea of creating homogenous Serbian state by 
forcefully expelling, assimilating, or even by persecution and murder. That is 
‘pathological homogenization’ as a means of state building is used. It refers 
to the methods state builders have used to define the state as a normative 
order and cumulative identification through targeting those designed as 
outsiders (in this case Albanians) for discriminatory and often violent 
treatment.38 
 Clearly ethnic Albanians are distinct culturally and that since that 
identity is difficult to change, assimilate or forcefully convert to the main 
stream Serbian culture, the most likely measure is expulsion or 
extermination. And hence ethnic cleansing pursued, by giving symbolic 
attachment to Kosovo as their existence is threatened because of the 
existence of what they call it aliens ethnic groups, i.e. Albanians. On the 
other hand, Albanians had also developed strong symbolic attachments with 
the land as they claimed historical rights derived from the ancient Illyrians 
who populated the Balkans before the settlement of the south Slavs.39 
 
Reactions of Kosovar Albanians  
 As Albanians in Kosovo are considered outsiders and subject to 
different harsh treatment at the hands of Serbians that resulted in their rights 
tramped, the people kept poor and illiterate because of economic, political 
and educational apartheid. Hence Albanians by and large had no choice but 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Rae, Heather, State identities and homogenization of peoples. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002.  
39 Angeliki Sotiropoulous, ‘the role of ethnicity in ethnic conflict: the case of Yugoslavia.’  
    University of Bath. See foot note no.7 
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to fight back.40 So Albanians see bleak future in the absence of autonomy 
and self-determination. Lake and Rothchild argue that ethnic conflicts result 
from the collective fear of the future (often lived through the shared 
memories of the past) by groups that feel unprotected by the state.41 Thus, 
Albanians rather than getting protection faced persecution by the state.  
 The development of Serb nationalism as such reinvigorates Albanian 
nationalism at the same time. Kosovars as a minority in Serbia fears 
extinction as their survival is questionable including physical safety and 
security in the face of Serbian hegemony and repression. Ethnic apartheid in 
Kosovo exacerbated ethnic mistrust and heightened the insecurity of the 
Kosovars.42 Such insecurity increased ethnic Albanian solidarity and 
deepening the mutual hatred. In such adversarial situation individuals will 
sacrifice for their groups cause that further escalated the conflict.  
 The Kosovars used the same logic as Serbians, of ancient hatreds, a 
sense of historic victimization and exploit those myths for group 
solidification. Walling in his article, ‘the History & Politics of Ethnic 
Cleansing’ rightly indicated that:  
Ethnicities made fearful by repressive state measures may struggle 
more ardently for statehood. Statehood is idealized to the degree that 
an ethnic group without a state is viewed as a politically incomplete 
and vulnerable because it lacks the protective power that the state 
provides.43 
 Asymmetry of power is the striking features of ethnic conflicts 
between the government and the rebellion. As a result the militarily weak 
groups will has strong incentives to conduct guerilla campaigns and launch 
‘terrorist’ attacks against soft, high value targets, like cities, towns, villages, 
in an attempt to force powerful adversaries in to acquiescence.44  
 In response to harsh measures Kosovars began non-violent protest. 
Ibrahim Rugova, the late president of Kosovo, founded the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (DLK) in 1989. He countered the policy of concerted 
repression with the Gandhian non-violent resistance, set up parallel 
government for the Kosovar Albanians during the years of Serbian rule in the 
1990s.45 Because its autonomy was officially revoked and subject to Serbian 
administration, parallel informal economic, political and cultural structures 
                                                          
40 Rezun, 2001; Booth (ed.), 2001 
41 Lake and Rothchild cited in Ken Booth’s (ed.), The Kosovo Tragedy: the Human Right  
    Dimensions, 2001, 57. 
42  See Carrie Booth Walling in Ken Booth (ed.) “The Kosovo Tragedy, the Human Right  
     Dimension’, 2001, 60. 
43  Ibid, 59. 
44  Brown in Guibernau & Rex (eds), 1997, 92. 
45  Rezun, 2001, 78 
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were formed to offset some of the problems.  
 By deliberately avoiding violence he calculated that he would avoid 
providing the Serb authorities in to open conflict and that he would gradually 
gain the support of the international community for Kosovo’s 
independence.46 Indeed the non-violent tactic of resistance earned him great 
support from the international community. Even Milosevic tolerated his 
pacifism precisely because it was kept the Albanians quite since at the time 
Milosevic was trapped by Croatian and Bosnian war so it’s not surprising for 
that tolerance. But after the war Milosevic turn to Kosovo as another 
scapegoat for his domestic problems.47 Following Milosevic’s turn to 
Kosovo, the non-violent movement became ineffective. The major blow 
comes with the Dayton Accord of 1995 which made no mention of their 
predicament.48 The international community has always made clear that it 
would not support an independent Kosovo because it would not support 
secession and a redrawing of international borders which might awaken 
latent or historical claims elsewhere in the region.49 Therefore the inability of 
non-violence to yield result compounded with the non consideration of their 
problem in the Dayton Accord and the failure of the international community 
to give effective support to the Kosovar Albanians in their struggle for self-
determination led to increasing number of Albanians to support the militant 
separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
 The radicals hand is strengthened and the moderates ignored, even 
targeted by the radicals. Hence, Rugova was seen as lenient and lost 
credibility. So they demand nothing short of independence. As a result the 
non-violent movement gave way to violent means. This led to the brutal 
reprisals by the Serbian government and the conflict further escalated. Ethnic 
polarization and radicalization increased as violence increases. Since power 
is asymmetric and Serbia’s military was the most powerful, hundreds of 
thousands of Albanians were forced to flee and thousands murdered, 
persecuted and raped.  
 Till the Dayton Accord the international community had been little 
interest to the Kosovo issue partly because of the gap between the 
inviolability of borders enshrined in the UN charter and the principle of self-
determination.50 The two sides locked in to a spiraling ethnic violence and 
reprisal.  
 The brutality and the ensuing ethnic cleansing forced the 
                                                          
46  Richard Caplan, International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo, International Affairs, 
vol. 74, No. 4, 1998. 
47  Rezun, 2001 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid. 
50  See Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
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international community, particularly the Western powers to intervene, and 
asked Serbia to stop the actions taking against the Kosovars indiscriminately. 
To address the problem peace talks was held at Rambouillet, near Paris, on 
February 1999. 
 The Romabouillet Accord for peace and self government in Kosovo 
contains various articles. 
It includes democratically elected government in Kosovo that would 
allow self government, but not actual independence for at least three 
years before a vote was to be cast. It demands end to force and 
withdrawal of Serbian forces, return of refugees, release of all 
prisoners, etc. Once these provisions were undertaken a new 
constitution for Kosovo would allow for Yugoslavia to control 
territorial integrity, the market, defense, foreign policy, custom, federal 
taxation and federal elections. The proposed police force was to be 
supervised and monitored by the organization for Security & 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Implementation Force, which was to 
be given unrestricted movement and access and was to monitor and 
inspect all law enforcement activities. It was also to supervise 
elections. In addition NATO was to establish a force to support the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) to ensure compliance. The force would stay in 
Kosovo for three years leading to a referendum after which Kosovo 
would decide its own future.51 
 The last provisions were not accepted by the Serbs as interference in 
the domestic affairs and violation of sovereignty, so they could not allow 
OSCE and NATO to come in Kosovo.52 The Kosovars signed the Accord 
while Serbia refused to sign because of the above reason. Western powers 
gave ultimatum for Serbia to sign otherwise will face bombardment by 
NATO. Serbia failed to sign the accord and was heavily bombed causing 
enormous material and human costs that forced her to accept the Accord. 
The fear of Serbia was if she accepts the Accord Kosovo will go after 
sometimes with a referendum.  
 
THE POST 1999 WAR PERIOD AND KOSOVO’S FUTURE  
 Following the end of the war, although by law still part of Serbia, 
Kosovo has separate administration and was a de facto independent state 
under international supervision.53 Kosovars want complete independence. 
Moderate solutions seem unacceptable. Today all political groupings in 
Kosovo agree that a simple return to the 1974 autonomy is unacceptable 
                                                          
51 Rezun, 2001, 51-52 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid,  78 
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since in their view the two republic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1997 
is a construction fundamentally different from Tito’s six-republic SFRY.54  
 Added to here is also that Montenegro one of the two only remaining 
republics of Yugoslavia was declared independence on June 2006 peacefully 
through referendum from Serbia. The Kosovars has reasons to claim 
independence. Montenegro and Serbia culturally and ethnically has same 
Slavic roots and their relations were peaceful. Albanians on the other hand 
can reason that they are ethnically and culturally different vis-à-vis Serbia 
and their relation is one of the worst mutual hatred.  
 Even after several years since the end of the 1999 war virulent hatred 
is alive today as it was at the beginning of the war. The blood feud and 
retaliations by the hate-filled Albanians is pervasive. For instance, the KLA 
want to derive out all the Serbs that they remained in Kosovo after the war 
no matter their innocence.  
The trauma of the war and the subsequent deep rooted mutual hatred 
is not easy to forget. For instance the city of Mitrovica has been 
symbol of ethnic hatred. The French peacekeepers have kept the city 
divided much like the city of Berlin at the height of cold war. 
Albanians live in the South and Serbs in the North divided by a bridge 
manned on a full time basis by peacekeepers. At night each side plays 
loud patriotic songs trying to drown out the other.55 
 Such hatreds, thus, pose a serious obstacle to bring peace in the post 
war Kosovo. Many Serbs left Kosovo following the end of the war fearing 
reprisals and of course many revenge killings on both sides reported. For 
instance in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, only elderly Serbs remain. They 
are generally housebound, frightened to leave lest they be attacked.56 
 Given the above factors it seems that condition for independence is 
ripe and many believe separation as the best alternative to end a century old 
problem.  
 The minority Serbs, however, indicated that they will never accept an 
independent Kosovo that seem a great challenge. Of course the UN proposal 
for independence give special protection for Serb minorities in Kosovo to 
have large autonomy including direct link with the mainland Serbia in 
business matters and other social linkages. Serbia’s influence in Serb 
dominated regions of Kosovo is high and Serbian parallel systems in all 
areas are operating. Although it is not entirely negative the tendency to 
operate in the shadows is what makes the Serbian parallel system a serious 
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challenge to United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIC).57  
 UNMIC under Res. 1244 is in charge of interim administration, even 
did not state for independence of Kosovo rather allow Serbian leadership to 
argue for the inclusion of Kosovo in Serbia.58 Some advocated division of 
Kosovo into two.  
For instance Nebojsa Covic, a member of Milosevic regime and after 
his fall the Serbian vice-prime Minster, proposed that Kosovo should 
be divided into two territorial entities, ‘Albanian and Serbian’. He 
argued that this would avoid a total separation of Kosovo from 
Serbia, and balance ‘Serbian historical right’ and Albanian ‘ethnic’ 
rights of the region.59  
 The UN proposal for the future status assigned to Ahteesari, former 
Finnish president, indicating independence as the clear option to settle the 
problem;  
On March 26, 2007 Ahtisaari distributed to the UN Security Council 
his final package of proposals for Kosovo, which included a clear 
recommendation that Kosovo should become independent, subject to 
a period of international supervision. Immediately after the proposals 
become public, the United States and Germany (in its capacity as EU 
Presidency) issued strong statements of support. The EU's 
Parliament has also declared its full support to Ahtisaari's plan. 
Russia, however, has called for new rounds of negotiations.60  
 Some Europeans and Russians are skeptical, believing it would 
trigger a war in Macedonia or Bosnia. Serbia rejects any independence for 
Kosovo, while Pristina welcomes the proposal. The main sufferers may 
never dream again to be part of Serbia in whatever arrangement, 
remembering their traumas of centuries.  
 Finally, Kosovo unilaterally declare independence on February 2008 
and today gained recognition by nearly 100 states of the world including 
powerful states like the USA and several EU countries. However, its 
independence is vehemently rejected by Serbia and its allies primarily 
Russia. As expected many Serbs in Kosovo also rejected its separation and 
rule by the dominant Albanians. They recognize only Serbian authority and 
are still not under direct control by Pristina. 
 Belgrade also attempted to challenge Kosovo’s independence at the 
International Court of Justice. The court, however, decided in July 2010 that 
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the declaration of independence did not constitute a violation of international 
law.61 
 It seems that Serbia’s government is attempting to accept and work 
with the existing reality in Kosovo. They started a dialogue in 2011 under 
European Union facilitation. Yet no agreement is reached regarding the 
status of Kosovo, Serb dominated areas of northern Kosovo (largely loyal to 
Belgrade), periodic violence among the two communities arising from the 
fervor of nationalism and mutual suspicion. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 Post-communist Yugoslavia and the Balkan as a whole plunged into 
negative nationalism created by ideological vacuum. The regime of 
Yugoslavia unable to manage economic, political and ethnic matters finds 
one another scapegoats to distract the troubles of its population into a means 
of prolonging the government’s tenure. After losing several republics, the 
regime turns to Kosovo appealing for historical claims over the region. Such 
historical appeal wisely exploited by Milosevic in time where his legitimacy 
wane and succeeded to retain his popularity by aggressively defending the 
minority Serbs right in Kosovo.  
 Hardin (1995) rightly observed that in the disintegrated post 
communist Yugoslavia it was not the past that dictated to the present but the 
present that manipulated the past.62Ethnicity is a soft target along with 
history and myth which emotionally outburst the respective groups to 
respond to elite manipulation. Here the Albanians and Serbs have developed 
competing and conflicting histories and interpretations of specific events. As 
a result polarization along ethnic faultiness intensified leaving no room for 
moderate compromise. They put their demand in absolute terms. Fear, hatred 
and insecurity derived from ethnic mistrust, denial of identity and 
consideration of ‘outsider’ or ‘foreign body’ in their own home land further 
deteriorated the situation and radicalizes Kosovar Albanians. 
 The setbacks for inter ethnic interactions in Kosovo largely to be 
blamed on Serbian authorities who adopted forced Serbianization and 
apartheid like attitude towards the majority Albanian population. Rather than 
inciting ethnic hatred to cover their political folly the authorities should have 
been worked in creating civic identity and civic nationalism to maintain the 
semblance of the nation.  
 The more the political elites of Serbia became nationalist, the more 
the targeted Albanians to become radicalized. Ethnic tension is not the 
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demand of the people to procure some benefit; rather it is used by political 
elites as an instrument to further their interest through mobilizing large 
population. Because of the pressure and burden of culture the various groups 
identified themselves with their own ethnic identity and excluding the rest. 
And hence solidified a sense of ‘we’ and ‘others/outsiders’ so they demonize 
their enemies/ ‘others’ who did not share the same identity.  
 The Kosovo war gives big lesson to the world no matter its 
controversy. It directed the significance of intervention to avert major 
humanitarian catastrophes by irresponsible government on its citizens under 
the guise of domestic matter. Nationalism, though, need not necessarily be 
unpacific, in Yugoslavia and the Balkan in general has bloody history.  
 The future statues of Kosovo need to be determined based on the 
aspiration of the people’s of Kosovo for self determination given the historic 
experience of Serbs hegemony and oppression. Again minority rights with in 
Kosovo must be protected by instituting democratic governance and 
institutions in maintaining ethnic diversity rather than ethnic transfer or 
territorial partition. If the issue is not solved on the people’s demand the 
problem will be transferred to future generation resulting recurrent deadly 
conflicts that continued to sow the seeds of revenge. It is only, through the 
will of the people and democratic administration that the dark history of the 
region could come to an end.  
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